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stated.
In addition to that, we must bear upon
Taraki; if we are already talking about the
deployment of forces, then the question must
be considered thoroughly. We cannot de-
ploy troops without a request from the gov-
ernment of Afghanistan, and we must con-
vey this to Comrade Taraki. And this must
be directly stated in a conference between
Comrade Kosygin and Taraki. In addition
to this, Taraki must be instructed to change
his tactics. Executions, torture and so forth
cannot be applied on a massive scale. Reli-
gious questions, the relationship with reli-
gious communities, with religion generally
and with religious leaders take on special
meaning for them. This is a major policy
issue. And here Taraki must ensure, with
all decisiveness, that no illicit measures
whatsoever are undertaken by them.
The documents must be prepared no
later than tomorrow. We will consult with
Leonid Ilych as to how we can best accom-
plish this.
USTINOV. We have a second option
which has also been prepared. This one
deals with the deployment of two divisions
into Afghanistan.
ANDROPOV. We need to adopt the
draft of the decision which we have exam-
ined today, accounting for those changes and
amendments which have been discussed. As
far as the political decision is concerned, that
also must be immediately prepared, because
bands are streaming in from Pakistan.
PONOMAREV. We should send
around 500 persons into Afghanistan in the
capacity as advisors and specialists. These
comrades must all know what to do.
ANDROPOV. Around Herat there are
20 thousand civilians who have taken part
in the rebellion. As far as negotiations with
Taraki are concerned, we must get on with
it. But I think it is best for Comrade Kosygin
to speak with Taraki.
ALL. Agreed. It is better for Com-
rade Kosygin to speak with him.
ANDROPOV. We must finalize the
political statement, bearing in mind that we
will be labeled as an aggressor, but that in
spite of that, under no circumstances can we
lose Afghanistan.
PONOMAREV. Unfortunately, there
is much that we do not know about Afghani-
stan. It seems to me that, in the discussion
with Taraki, all these questions must be
raised, and in particular, let him explain the
state of affairs with the army and in the coun-
try generally. After all, they have a 100,000-
man army and with the assistance of our ad-
visors, there is much that the army can do.
Otherwise, 20 thousand insurgents are go-
ing to achieve a victory. Above all, it will
be necessary to accomplish everything that
is necessary with the forces of the Afghan
army, and only later, if and when the neces-
sity truly arises, to deploy our own forces.
KOSYGIN. In my view it is neces-
sary to send arms, but only if we are con-
vinced that they will not fall into the hands
of the insurgents. If their army collapses,
then it follows that those arms will be
claimed by the insurgents. Then the ques-
tion will arise as to how we will respond in
the view of world public opinion. All this
will have to be justified, that is, if we are
really going to deploy our forces, then we
must marshal all of the appropriate argu-
ments and explain everything in detail. Per-
haps one of our responsible comrades should
travel to Afghanistan in order to understand
the local conditions in greater detail. Per-
haps Comrade Ustinov or Comrade
Ogarkov.
USTINOV. The situation in Afghani-
stan is worsening. We ought to speak now,
it seems to me, about political measures that
we have not yet undertaken. And, on the
other hand, we must fully exploit the capa-
bility of the Afghan army. It seems to me
there is no point in me going to Afghani-
stan; I have doubts about that. Perhaps some
member of the government should go.
KOSYGIN. You must go there none-
theless, Dmitri Fedorovich [Ustinov]. The
point is that we are sending into Afghani-
stan a large volume of armaments, and it is
necessary that they remain in the hands of
the revolutionary masses. We have about
550 advisors in Afghanistan, and they must
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 139
be apprised of the state of affairs in the mili-
tary.
USTINOV. Even if one of us goes to
Afghanistan, still nobody is going to learn
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